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Joe Hughes’ recent study Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation
makes the apparently straightforward claim that Deleuze’s ‘middle
period’, and indeed beyond, should be read as a consistent and repeated
meditation on the processes of the constitution of representation. Its
syntheses, and their necessary constitutions of subjectivity, of forms of
production and of time provide a tangibly coherent theme across these
apparently quite different texts. Running counter to the image of Deleuze
as an endlessly inventive concept factory, Hughes unequivocally reads
The Logic of Sense, Anti-Oedipus andDifference and Repetition as each
in their own way articulating a systematic phenomenological return to
essentially the same process of the constitution of experience. Despite
its beginning with and constantly emphasising the transcendental,
‘Deleuze’s thought ends in phenomena, an empirical consciousness of
fully individuated objects’ (6). But Hughes’ text is more than a review of
Deleuze’s relations with phenomenology. As the Preface makes clear,
while the influence of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger on Deleuze has
not escaped critical notice, the ‘Husserlian inspiration behind Deleuze’s
work’ has been overlooked. Given the few direct references to Husserl
in the books in question, this is understandable. But Hughes makes
a strong case particularly for the relevance of Husserl’s late work in
understanding Deleuze’s treatment of genetic constitution. This locating
of the basic motivation behind these texts in a consistent body of
influence is the key to Hughes’ presentation of Deleuze’s work as the
project of ‘a systematic and totalizing thinker’ (157) occupied with the
problem of genesis ‘from the very first book to the last’ (15). Deleuze
is of course well known for describing his philosophy as classical and
metaphysical, and his thought as ‘like a hill’ which changes very little,
especially in contrast to Guattari’s (in)famously volatile hyperactivity.
Hughes’ skill lies in looking into this immobility and highlighting the
ways in which key themes and indeed structuring processes persist at the
heart of key texts.
In so doing Hughes carries out a task which bears comparison with
literary detective work. The comparison may seem ad hoc, but it helps
to emphasise just how engaging and well-written Hughes’ study really
is, drawing on the work of Husserl, among others, to bear witness
to Deleuze’s phenomenology. Moreover, while few would underplay
the importance of literature to Deleuze, Hughes implies that we might
well to take its formal influence even more seriously. We are reminded
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early on that The Logic of Sense describes itself as ‘an attempt to
develop a logical and psychological novel’ (20), and Hughes takes this
reference at its word. His detective work attempts to unravel story from
plot and to draw a series of incisive deductions and conclusions with
something of the style of a sleuth tracing the clues in a particularly thorny
case.
Hughes draws from this literary reference, however, an approach not
only to style but also to content. He claims this narratological logic
of plot and story can be discerned across the work of this period and
beyond, with examples reaching from Empiricism and Subjectivity to
the final texts. In making this well-argued claim, Hughes offers revealing
insights into the repetition of key themes under the sign (although
not the style) of the novel. And if, following his lead, Hughes’ own
text were to conceal a story beneath its plot, what would it be? The
plot is quite clearly an investigation of the importance of experience
and representation, and of how, from a phenomenological standpoint,
they are constituted. But the story uncovers Deleuze’s monistic return
to this theme just as a Série noire detective novel might consider the
mechanics of serial criminality of a mind perhaps unaware of its own
idée fixe. If the ‘French school’ of such fiction draws its conclusions
from basic intuition and gut feelings, while the ‘English’ school works
by deduction and evidence (Deleuze 2003: 115), one would have to
say that here Hughes displays the second method while perhaps taking
inspiration and drive from the first. Many readers of Deleuze are in
equal measure intrigued and perplexed by the apparent proliferation
of ideas which nevertheless seem, perhaps paradoxically at first, to
cohere into a project. This project, partly masked by constant shifts in
terminology, focus, sources and collaborators, is the concern of Deleuze
and the Genesis of Representation. But Hughes’ detective story is less
a ‘whodunit’ than a ‘howdunit’, because he has clearly also seen that
an important underlying thread does indeed link the range, however
volcanic, of Deleuze’s work. The aim therefore is to elucidate how this
cohesion comes about, and the hunch is followed up in a style which
might be described as Holmesian: deductive, incisive and self-assured,
but not without a certain dry wit and even, at times, theatricality, in its
claims.
Hughes’ argument similarly has the advantage of a formal simplicity
in so far as the book is divided into three parts, each dealing with
one of the texts in question. Part one explores and justifies the focus
on Husserl, considering the way his ideas are reflected in The Logic
of Sense. Part two turns to Anti-Oedipus and the genesis of the ego
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in desiring and social production; while part three draws together the
static and dynamic geneses as described in Difference and Repetition.
Each section lays out its points and draws partial conclusions which
both reinforce the central thesis and open out to related issues. One
example among many is the way part three considers, on top of the
general theme of genesis, Difference and Repetition’s postulation of the
non-transcendental constitution of time. Hughes is able not only to
unravel Deleuze’s description of these processes, but also to round up
this complex problem succinctly:
[I]n other words, just as the other two passive syntheses produced not
representations in specific temporal modalities, but the transcendental
possibility of those modalities themselves, this third synthesis does not
produce a determinate future, but the transcendental element of the future
in general. (149)
This tracking of the ways in which the syntheses of the sub-
representational domain are inseparable from the constitution of
modalities of time themselves allows Hughes to return to this
relationship in his conclusion. Here, he clearly identifies the important
threshold between the sub-representational domain and the emergence
of consciousness of phenomena as representations: ‘In the third
synthesis, however, time ceases to be transcendental. By means of the
progressive determination and actualization of Ideas, time becomes a
representation which passes in the present of an empirical consciousness’
(154).
This succinctness is used to good effect throughout the book and plays
a part in conferring an impressive degree of coherence to the text as a
whole. This is clearly intended, of course, and is all the more evident on
closer reading of the three sections.
In the first part, Hughes begins by outlining those areas of Husserlian
phenomenology which form the basis of The Logic of Sense. Among
these, he highlights two phenomenological moves, namely those of
reduction, or the putting out of play of those phenomena which are not
part of the objectively given world, and of constitution, or the genetic
production of objects in consciousness. The latter is especially important
in that thought as representation, the building of the transcendental from
the empirical, can only be meaningful if we have a theory of how objects
and sense are constituted in the first place. Accordingly, the theory of
perception developed in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception
is also stressed in its postulation of immanent relations between objects.
Keen to counter prevailing views of Deleuze as anti-phenomenological,
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Hughes argues that, although Deleuze ‘never makes a big deal of the
reduction’ (6), critics (such as Lawlor and Brassier) are right to contend
that, despite appearances, he ends up in a basically phenomenological
position: consciousness of individuated objects in a field of perception
where relations always already exist. In support of this, examples of
‘significant use’ of the reduction are drawn from Proust and Signs
and from Deleuze’s criticisms of the image of thought, particularly in
Difference and Repetition, where ‘Deleuze’s critique of the image of
thought can thus be read as a reaffirmation of the necessity for reduction
even if he does not use that particular word’ (8).
Two important and related issues are linked to this, as the text makes
clear. The first is that, whatever other forms of phenomenology or
their interpreters may claim, this stance is by no means some idealistic
or relativistic denial of objective reality. The approach adopted by
Husserl/Deleuze does not deny the existence of external reality: the
table as phenomenon does not replace or cancel out the table as
object. The action of putting assumptions out of play does not leave us
confronting nothing, but rather instantiates the existence of the world of
phenomena in addition to that of objective reality. The second point,
again stressed throughout by Hughes, concerns the role of meaning.
Despite being central in Deleuze, Hughes picks it up as a key source
of misunderstandings. As he reminds us at several points in the text, the
world of the real as sense (hyletic) data is meaningless by itself until sense
is bestowed onto it by the passive syntheses. The commonplace view that
Deleuze argues that we should ask ‘what does it do?’ rather than ‘what
does it mean?’ is only valid up to this threshold of the emergence of
meaning, as we will see below. It follows that Deleuzian questioning
of the validity of interpretation or the consideration of meaning in
communication needs to be understood in the light of their constitution.
Accordingly, Deleuze’s critique of given forms of transcendence
therefore relies on an ability not just to postulate the constitution of
objects in experience, but also to describe the processes in question. For
Hughes, much of Deleuze’s work centres on this very task. Like Husserl,
Deleuze is concerned not just with describing phenomena, but also with
explaining them and their processes. Unlike the early Husserl however,
Deleuze is only interested in genetic phenomenology, or the immediate
production of sense rather than its sedimentation. It is not hard at this
point to agree that this relationship exists in a Deleuzian consideration of
meaning as event, and Hughes’ focus on this point takes its justification
precisely from this link. The clarity and confidence with which these
arguments are made is something of a hallmark and deserves, I think,
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wide recognition. Just as this claim is made, Hughes makes a point of
making clear not only what has been said, but also what is going to be
covered and how. He carefully lays out Husserl’s stance and situates it
exactly in his argument, showing how far Deleuze follows Husserl and
at which points they diverge, for instance in the former’s critique of a
Husserlian lack of phenomenological rigor or its intentionality, as we
will see.
However, the fact that the text appears to be arguing that the whole
of Deleuze’s work can in effect be rooted in one concept of Husserl’s
phenomenology may well strike some readers as problematic. Hughes
himself accepts that this does not necessarily justify our use of the
phenomenology label – admittedly a question ‘of little importance’ (19).
What it does do, however, is to situate the movement of Deleuze’s
thought between two well-defined poles: the genesis of thought is to
be scrutinised, and the method of reduction is to be used as a basic
observational technique. It is in this light that we should read The Logic
of Sense, and, according to Hughes, Anti-Oedipus.
Part two’s focus on Anti-Oedipus as description of genesis is
particularly interesting in so far as it brings a certain coherence to the
proliferation of ideas for which the book is notorious. The treatment of
the text and its complexities is both systematic and enlightening and as
such complements existing studies by Goodchild (1996), Holland (1999)
and, more recently, Buchanan (2008), with which readers are doubtless
familiar. A crucial argument, however, is made regarding the claim to
identify cross-textual themes. Not only does reading Anti-Oedipus from
the point of view of production make the text easier to understand,
but, in fact, ‘if the book is read as a collection of separate concepts
with only ambiguous relations to one another, it becomes impossible
to understand’ (66). Whether Hughes is right naturally depends on
whether we accept his central claim. But his analysis does at the very
least also raise some interesting questions. The first of these is whether
Deleuze’s work is one which should be ‘understood’ on these terms.
Speaking personally, I feel that Hughes’ argument is convincing, but
some readers will doubtless point to the many ways in which a work such
as Anti-Oedipus seems to escape categorisation in any way, least of all,
perhaps, in terms of meaning. As Foucault once suggested (mischievously
perhaps?), meaning itself might be displaced by the effectiveness of
this ‘thing’, which he ‘dare not even call a book’, and which refers
to nothing other than its ‘own prodigious theoretical inventiveness’
(Foucault 1997: 7). This issue of the displacement of meaning by
effect –what does it mean? by what does it do? – is one which Hughes
442 Reviews
takes up, arguing that we are wrong to assume that meaning is never
relevant, as we have seen. For Deleuze, a focus on the meaning-less
depths does not mean that meaning itself is excised from thought, merely
that it must be understood as produced on top of the genetic syntheses
of experience. In this light, the demystification of the text as object is
welcome, especially to newer readers of Deleuze who often turn, rightly
or wrongly, to Anti-Oedipus before some of the less well-known books.
The second question raised by Hughes’ argument introduces its own
double movement. Because it is necessary for Hughes to demonstrate his
thesis across a range of texts, there is the implicit need to reassess the role
of Guattari in the collaborations. The aim here, it would seem, is not to
expunge Guattari’s contributions –which Deleuze of course stresses as
being of fundamental importance, for instance in well-known passages
of Dialogues (Deleuze and Parnet 1996: 23–4). However, to argue that
Deleuze’s concern with genesis is a continuous theme requires that it
be shown to lie at the heart of the collaborative work, which, by that
token, must be revealed to be essentially ‘Deleuzian’. Guattari, I will
suggest later, comes out of this argument as a peripheral figure, almost
as collateral damage.
Part three tackles Difference and Repetition with much the same
gusto as parts one and two. Hughes is keen to point out that his view
goes ‘against the grain’ of current readings which emphasise the text as
‘more or less a theory only of the static genesis’ (103). On the contrary,
we are exhorted to see Difference and Repetition alongside the other
texts studied and to realise that for Deleuze, the question of the world
of phenomena and its genesis is the same throughout. Deleuze goes
well beyond the constitution of experience itself, however. He theorises
not just the actualisation of phenomena in individual, differenciated
subjects, but also describes how this is necessarily implicated in the
production of temporality itself: not only does the virtual engender
unindividuated actuality, but the process is reciprocal, and founded on
the production of time as actualisation takes place. In typical style,
Hughes outlines in a brief table just how schematic this process is, at least
in its correspondence between texts. Clear parallels are drawn between
dynamic genesis, desiring production and the production of time, on
one hand, and static genesis, social production and differenciation-
individuation on the other.
Interestingly, Hughes begins his explanation by problematising critical
readings (e.g. those of Badiou or Hallward) of Deleuze as ‘otherworldly’,
particularly in his emphasis on the virtual. The point missed by such
critics is that Deleuze does indeed theorise the constitution of the virtual
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as a time in which Ideas are structured: by proving the concreteness
of Ideas and the determination of the virtual, we can show how the
virtual–actual dyad escapes this critique of Deleuze as being a merely
contemplative thinker. The central argument is that for Deleuze creative
actualisation is the ‘true meaning of time’ (110): it is the very process of
progressive determination which determines where Ideas come from and
go to. It is the process by which the future itself becomes present and is
thus an indispensable movement of realisation.
Here Hughes is typically concise in his definitions and argument:
I want to suggest here that the Deleuzian Idea is the form that any concrete
object takes before we fully recognise or know what that object is. In the Idea,
the object itself becomes a problem for thought. Progressive determination
would then be nothing more than the progressive determination of a concrete
object of perception. (115)
What’s more, this welcome concision is not infrequently accompanied
by a certain dry humour: ‘Despite the fact that Deleuze used the
vocabulary of biology and the example of differenciation in the egg
almost exclusively to describe the process of actualization, we have to
notice that the outcome of this process is not a chicken’ (116).
Despite (or perhaps because of) its focus, Hughes’ study is able to
lend some clarity to key elements of the Deleuzian panoply, almost
as an aside. One example is the development of an argument which
clearly presents the role of representation as the end point of quality
and extensity which can only refer to represented objects as such. If
actualisation produces psychological consciousness, then it does so via
the forms of representation as ‘the element of knowledge’ (118) which
has its own legitimate and non-legitimate uses.
This section of Hughes’ book (119–26) is one of the richest and
best argued, presenting a whole series of points which tie into the
main theme. We return to the ‘dead representations’ of The Logic of
Sense, and the legitimate use of representation which recognises its
necessarily mobile nature, being ‘legitimate insofar as it is tied to its
process of production’ (120). The point is important enough to attract
the claim that it ‘seems to be the ultimate aim of Difference and
Repetition, and perhaps of Deleuze’s philosophy in this middle period
as a whole’ (119). The role of representation is especially important
if we take Hughes’ point that it must be understood as a result of
static genesis: rather than being dynamic in movement and material
dispersion it begins in a form of time and culminates in representation
as, ultimately, a static form of things available to human consciousness.
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This of course leads to a final description of dynamic genesis equated
to the production of time (127). After covering the familiar ground
of Bergsonian analysis of (dis)continuity in time/movement, Hughes
argues that the necessary syntheses of movement cannot be produced
without a form of originary subjectivity which carries out the synthesis.
Hughes’ reading of Difference and Repetition makes crucial links here
between the role of habit and contraction and synthesis itself in the
formation of subjectivity, but he also stresses the latter’s limited field
of operation. It is the limited ability of the subject to ‘grasp’ the fullness
of its experiences that leads to its exhaustion. It seems worth noting that
Hughes’ point about the translatability of these ideas across the whole of
Deleuze is quite borne out by reflections of just this point in later work,
notably in The Time Image, where Deleuze draws explicitly on Blanchot
(Deleuze 1985: 221–2). The ‘contemplative soul’, or synthetic ego seen
in the work of Europe’s great film directors, is not one of Husserlian
intentionality, but rather of the individual gifted only with the ‘empty
power to exchange itself for something’. This power, being empty only
in so far as it exchanges itself for everything, is exactly the same as that
of the ‘seers’ whose ‘impower of thought’ Deleuze situates in cinema’s
special ability to create such images through characters such as Johannes
in Dreyer’s Ordet.
In the psychic situation of films such as Ordet, it is the character
as seer who, apparently a marionette incapable of thought or action,
relies instead on belief, thus reminding us of the need to affirm both the
irrationality of the real and our relationship with this world rather than
attempting to transcend it with ‘reason’. As Ambrose (2007) stresses,
what is striking is the way in which the automatic can force thought,
how the very lack of rational awareness of characters can inspire
movement in our own reflective processes. Hughes, by demonstrating
the (progressively) determined nature of subjectivity, draws a line of
connection from the earliest work on Hume directly into the cinema
books and the consideration of subjectivity that closes his third chapter,
stressing the role of constitution and the implications this has for
alterity.
This closing section is one where one fully appreciates that, across
the three chapters of Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation, a key
strength of the study is its own coherence, down in part to the extreme
care taken to make points clearly. We are left in no doubt as to the
goal of the text in showing that ‘there is a very general yet consistent
conceptual structure behind Deleuze’s three central texts, and that this
structure traced out a consistent theory of the genesis of representation’
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(158). This clarity ranges from statements of the intent of the study, to
the cross-reference of points throughout its three main chapters. Each
part builds on the others and frequent links forward and back are of
great help as complex arguments are followed across texts. Hughes, as
we have seen, has a talent for pithy summaries which many readers will
appreciate. This is perhaps especially the case when they develop a real
sense of dialogue with the reader by basing deductions on questions
which, Hughes rightly assumes, the reader is likely to ask at a given
stage. Consequently – and somewhat in tune with the detective novel
theme – rather than present his arguments as faits accomplis, Hughes is
not afraid to ask questions as if thinking through the points himself,
which makes one feel at home within the argument and often slightly
less uncomfortable about having failed to grasp a particular point. This,
alongside the combination of detailed argument and concise roundups,
succeeds in making the text open to a wide readership, indeed clarifying
some points as well as, if not better than, some introductory guides.
A good example of this is the way in which Hughes tackles ‘side’
themes, such as of ‘fatigue’ (137–8) which, as he points out, may be
assumed to result from the passage of time. Since Hughes shows that
time cannot depend for its constitution on syntheses which in turn
depend on other syntheses, it makes no sense to see exhaustion as
being a result of the passage of time in infinite regress. The genetic ego
therefore suffers fatigue, on the contrary, because of its limited ability
to contract relations and exhausts itself because it contemplates too
much, ‘trying to possess too many instants in one grasp’ (138). Despite
appearances and quasi-causes, then, the cause of fatigue – and hence of
stability and escape from raw being – occurs within and because of a
limited, immanent contractual range.
The reader is also struck by Hughes’ refusal to be put off by
Deleuze’s terminological variety, concluding on the contrary that this
is no obstacle once one has perceived the basic unity of the work
and that despite manifest differences of style and language, essential
themes recur in the three texts in question. All that really changes is the
terms used to describe the movement of thought through the stages of
perception, a point to which the text often returns: ‘Despite the complete
disparity in technical vocabulary between books, there is a very strong
correspondence in their separate descriptions of these early stages of the
genesis’ (140). The attention paid by Hughes to this issue is extremely
helpful. For instance, while it is true, he argues, that the word ‘genesis’
appears only four times in Empiricism and Subjectivity, and even then
only to be criticised, we need to understand that the reference in this
446 Reviews
context is precisely to the Husserlian ‘sedimentation’ theory of sense
which Deleuze rejects elsewhere in favour of a more immediate and
dynamic interpretation. We are able therefore to see that the question
of Empiricism and Subjectivity is exactly that of the phenomenological
question of genesis: how does the subject arise from the given? (16).
These correspondences are supported by diagrams along the way
which show clearly how evolving sequences of syntheses relate to
each other. These culminate in a table (156) which shows how they
relate across the three texts studied. Given the sometimes oblique
ways in which Deleuze returns to topics from different angles, such
schematisations will be welcome to many in providing a ‘key’ of sorts
to the proliferating language which, if we are honest, can at times both
delight and frustrate us as readers.
Adding to this Hughes’ careful and sustained policy of recapping
and pre-capping, it becomes obvious from the way the text summarises
key points and presents others upstream that the whole project has
been worked out with the explicit goal of carrying the reader through
complex terrain. This is particularly obvious in part two, where Hughes
deals deftly with Anti-Oedipus, shedding a good deal of light on
this demanding text. Given the obviously daunting range of Deleuze
and Guattari’s first collaboration, there is much to be said for an
approach which selects one theme and follows it through the different
permutations to which it is subjected throughout the book, thus cracking
open some of its complexities. Moreover, comparing the same themes
across texts, rather than complicating things, actually makes them more
accessible, and once basic ideas have been established, the reader can
with more confidence use knowledge from one text to make sense of
another.
This confidence rubs off partly from Hughes’ own, which is clear in
instances where he takes critical aim at a number of commonplaces.
Included on the list of misreaders is Foucault, for instance, guilty of
taking ‘phantasm’ to mean the same in The Logic of Sense as it does
in Difference and Repetition (165 n. 34). Deleuze’s purported anti-
Hegelianism may also be entirely unfounded (134), with the former
offering instead a ‘flashy Hegel’ and a contingent view of history
whose non-teleology ‘still progresses according to a dialectical logic
of sublimation or double causality’ (170 n. 18). A further example
is Hughes’ convincing argument that a clarification of detours in the
treatment of the syntheses in Difference and Repetition justifies their
being understood as operating in linear fashion. Despite Deleuze’s
roundabout way of presenting the concepts, we need, for Hughes, to
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understand them as following a progression: each one relates to the
previous in a series of transcendental exercises (129) of each faculty.
Beyond the confident style, Hughes also has a series of genuine points
about Deleuze that seem well worth making and has produced a text
which, oddly perhaps, seems to fulfil two very different purposes. In the
first instance, it is a scholarly study of some of the most complex ideas
in the work of notoriously problematic thinkers. Hughes’ weaving of
a web of relations between Kant, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze
is something of a feat, but it might be more appropriate to call it
an ‘instruction’. Secondly, therefore, in situating Deleuze’s thought,
concepts such as static and dynamic genesis are explained with both
an eye to detail and an impressive command of the big picture and
the lines of argument being followed. The point here is that the text
appears to be achieving that rare goal of speaking to a remarkably wide
audience of both specialists and neophytes. A lack of familiarity with
the intricacies of Husserl’s late work is not a problem since the concepts
are so clearly laid out. What is more, the way these concepts are treated
is extremely helpful for anyone ‘perplexed’ by the difficulties of Deleuze
and the context of his ideas.
At the end of the book, Hughes seems to suggest that we may want
to question this apparently monotonous focus on the same theme, and
he is surely right to maintain a critical line. Craven homages to Deleuze
(and Guattari) which do little other than repeat their mots d’ordre do
nothing at all either for neophytes or those already familiar with the
work. Hughes’ criticality is refreshing then, and succeeds in operating
in the space between either glorifying or sacrificing Deleuze. Hughes,
thankfully, does neither, choosing instead a much finer path of balanced
and detailed critique whose aim is to clarify, explicate and situate his
subject.
Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation, then, ultimately impresses by
the strength and clarity of its arguments. Are there nevertheless details
which some readers may find problematic?
For Hughes, few have actually considered the debt owed by Deleuze
to phenomenology, and fewer still have been able to link his ideas
clearly to those of, for instance, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on this
score. To support these claims, repeated references are made to the
essentially phenomenological nature of Deleuze’s work. For some, this
will come as no surprise: Francois Dosse’s recent biography, despite
describing Deleuze’s attitude to phenomenology as ‘ambivalent’ and the
link to Husserl as largely superficial, reveals that Merleau-Ponty’s The
Visible and the Invisiblewas a favourite text (Dosse 2007: 189). Toscano
describes Deleuze as developing from Husserl ‘an-other phenomenology’
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(Toscano 2005: 204) . The extent to which Hughes’ reading goes ‘against
the grain’ then, might be open to question. Similarly, there are times
when the welcome degree of incisiveness and confidence risks tipping
over into a boldness which some might find excessive. One example is
when Hughes claims early on that ‘the only way to understand Deleuze’s
texts is to understand them as a theorization of genesis, and the only
way to understand a Deleuzian concept . . . is to determine its place and
function within the genesis in which it participates’ (16).
Not all will agree that ‘the only way’ to understand these texts
is indeed the one offered here. But the excessiveness or otherwise of
these claims can be judged only on the evidence made available, and
Hughes certainly provides plenty. Moreover, if the thesis of unity in the
work unsettles some readers, it will be welcomed by those disquieted
by readings which appear to see Deleuze as a sort of concept factory
whose productive machinery required no fuel, pulling rabbits out of
hats. I made the point earlier on that Hughes’ demystification is no bad
thing in attacking views of Deleuze which may appear both sanctifying
and actually unhelpful. While failing to explain anything much at all
about the work, they also provide ammunition to those who, rather
than welcome inventiveness, reproach what they see as obfuscation,
barbarism, irresponsibility and so on. Perhaps someday Deleuzians with
time on their hands will quantify just how much effort has been spent
rectifying the mis- (or non-) readings which proliferate, especially across
the social sciences, of Deleuze (and Guattari). A far better idea though
would be to consider Hughes’ text as an example of how elucidating
the genealogy through an explication of Deleuze’s work can provide
a genuine explanation of some of its most difficult ideas. Placing the
fabric of relations under the magnifying glass lifts them off the plane
and gives them a shape which allows us to see the texture of the
individual pieces and their warp and weft. The genuinely critical spirit
behind this raises questions about simplistic notions of creativity while
providing extremely useful contextual information about which other
fingerprints can be found on Deleuze’s work. Some may disagree with
Hughes that this demonstrates a profound, almost monotonous, unity
in Deleuze’s work at the level of its basic concerns. But I feel it must be
accepted that whereas he generates both light and heat, Hughes should
be congratulated for shedding much more of the former than the latter.
That said, and on a different and perhaps rather ungenerous note,
there are times when Hughes’ impressive clarity seems to slip a little.
Deleuze, as we know, claimed to ‘believe in philosophy as a system’
(Deleuze 2003: 338), but there are times when Hughes’ phraseology
seems to imply chinks of doubt that the systemic and systematic nature
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of the work is indeed clearly demonstrable. If Deleuze’s concepts initially
‘all come together to form a consistent, if not systematic, theory of
genetic constitution’ (20), they later become ‘systematic but incoherent’
(155), and then ‘systematic and totalizing’ further on (157). The extent
to which these phrases actually cloud Hughes’ point, however, is
minimal, and examples of this sort of hesitation are rare in the overall
tone of extreme clarity and incision.
A further reaction to Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation
may occur to readers who conclude that Hughes, contrary to Deleuze’s
advice (Deleuze 2003: 339–40), fails to remain concrete by giving one
concept primacy over another and focusing so closely on the essential
nature of genesis. This would be unfair, however, in that the text is at
pains to stress the ways in which Deleuzian syntheses are explications
of one another – albeit in a particular order – in contradistinction to
their Kantian counterparts whose a priori nature fails to explain their
constitution. A desire to engage with concrete questions beyond those of
‘simple’ perception also guides Hughes’ insistence on the complex role of
alterity in the system: it is the world without others, in its schizophrenic
depths, which makes genesis necessary as an escape from the chaos of
raw being (150–3). It is once more significant that on this point, as on
many others, Hughes sees a direct lineage between Husserl and Deleuze.
A final potential concern returns to the issue, raised by Hughes
himself, of the implications of recent biographical information for
our understanding of the Deleuze–Guattari writing relationship. One
may on one level recognise reflections of the not uncommon desire to
‘de-Guattarise’ Deleuze, which takes effect, intentionally or not, in
three ways. On the one hand, works are grouped together that some
may consider disparate, seeing no reason to assume that a co-authored
text should be considered any differently to individual work on this
account. Hughes moreover clearly considers What is Philosophy? to
be ‘Deleuze’s last major work’ (157), as indeed Deleuze himself seems
to imply when stating his desire to write ‘a short text’ offering a
clarification of the notion of concepts (Deleuze 2003: 339). On the
other hand, Hughes insists that the themes which underpin apparently
diverse works are the same: it is, by implication, Deleuze’s underlying
obsession with representation that is the real ‘story’ across the whole
corpus. A third example of the erasure of Guattari from the scene is
provided by Guattari himself, who claimed, in the Anti-Oedipus Papers,
that he did not ‘recognise’ himself in Anti-Oedipus (Guattari 2006).
Beyond details in support of the hypothesis downgrading Guattari’s role,
whether or not Hughes is correct to follow this thread depends of course
largely on the evidence he brings to the investigation, and the latter
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is substantial. Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Kant’s particular forms of
phenomenology are brought to bear in ways which make a convincing
case for identifying the hand of Deleuze at the centre even of the joint
work. Coupled with Dosse’s (2007) description of the decline in the
Deleuze–Guattari relationship, and his claim that What is Philosophy?
was indeed essentially written by the former, one might be tempted to
agree with Genosko (2001) that there is indeed a concerted and slightly
skewed attempt to de-Guattarise the ‘Deleuziana’. And yet while there
is certainly something to be said for demystifying the idea of a four-
handed concept factory, it would clearly be unfair to include Hughes
among those who maintain the ‘bad Guattari’ thesis. On the one hand,
there is no obvious reason why one should not focus on the key concerns
of one part of the authorial assemblage if one chooses, and indeed the
complexities of some of the arguments here certainly justify it. Deleuze
and the Genesis of Representation is no biography, and as a piece of
detection is not a ‘whodunit’ but a ‘howdunit’. Were it the former,
and spoke of ‘de-Guattarising’ Deleuze, why not also ‘de-Deleuze’ the
advocate of ‘becoming-imperceptible’ himself?
Chris Beighton
Canterbury Christ Church University
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